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TORTURING THE TICKING BOMB 
TERRORIST: AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIALLY 
SANCTIONED TORTURE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF TERRORISM 
CHANTERELLESUNG* 
WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RE-
SPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE. By Alan Dershowitz. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press 2002. Pp. 260. 
Abstract: Alan Dershowitz's book examines recent acts of global 
terrorism and analyzes the reasons why terrorism is successful. In an 
effort to reduce the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks, 
Dershowitz discusses different proposals that would deter terrorism 
while striking a balance between security and liberty. One of 
Dershowitz's most controversial proposals calls for the use of judicially 
sanctioned torture to force a terrorist suspect to reveal information that 
would prevent an imminent terrorist attack. This Book Review explores 
the justifications for judicially sanctioned torture and ultimately argues 
that such a proposal would be morally and legally prohibited. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of September 11, 2001, FBI agents suggested that 
they might resort to torture to compel terrorist suspects to reveal in-
formation necessary to prevent a recurrence} A senior FBI aide 
stated, "it could get to that spot where we could go to pressure ... 
where we won't have a choice, and we are probably getting there."2 
While many countries have condemned torture, the reemergence 
of this issue in public debate reflects the extent to which terrorism 
currently threatens national security.3 In his timely book, Why Terror-
* Staff Writer, BOSroN COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2002-2003). 
I Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 
21,2001, at A6. 
2Id. 
S ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY 'TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RE-
SPONDING ro THE CHALLENGE 134, 150 (2002); William F. Schulz, The Torturer's Apprentice, 
THE NATION, May 13, 2002, at 25 (reviewing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN A TuRBULENT AGE (2002». 
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ism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Alan 
Dershowitz analyzes the reasons why terrorism has succeeded thus far 
and offers proposals to deter terrorism while striking the appropriate 
balance between national security and civilliberties.4 Dershowitz con-
fronts and raises many difficult moral and legal questions regarding 
the extent to which our democratic society can effectively deter ter-
rorism while continuing to uphold fundamental values of liberty and 
privacy.5 He argues that it is possible to deter terrorism on both a 
macro level, by confronting different types of terrorism, and on a mi-
cro level, through controlling it on a smaller scale.6 
Dershowitz begins with the premise that some terrorists are ra-
tional actors who crave attention to their cause.7 Policies that address 
the root causes of terrorists' behavior, therefore, do not deter them 
but merely reward them with the attention that they crave.s Thus, in 
order to deter terrorism and preserve national security, society must 
punish terrorists through collective accountability and incapacita-
tion.9 To this end, Dershowitz offers various proposals to increase our 
sense of security without eroding the liberty that is central to a demo-
cratic society.lO 
This Book Review focuses on one of Dershowitz's most controver-
sial proposals: the use of judicially sanctioned non-lethal torture to 
force a terrorist suspect to disclose information that would prevent an 
imminent and massive terrorist attack. ll Under this proposal, lawen-
forcement officials would be allowed. to torture a terrorist suspect af-
ter first obtaining a judicial warrant from a court. 12 Dershowitz's pro-
posal responds to a long-standing moral dilemma commonly referred 
to as the "ticking bomb" scenario.13 The "ticking bomb" scenario re-
4 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 166-213. 
5 Id. at 3, 201. 
6Id. at 166. On a macro level, Dershowitz wants to eliminate incentives and impose de-
terrents to terrorism by incapacitating terrorists, and by ensuring that the international 
community does not reward terrorists with concessions and decreased support for target 
countries. Id. at 168, 170, 181. On a micro level, Dershowitz wants to strike a balance be-
tween security and liberty by, for example, tightening control over national borders, ex-
panding electronic monitoring authority, and requiring national ID cards. Id. at 187. 
7 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 20-23. 
8Id. at 24-25. 
9 Id. at 172-73, 181. 
10 Id. at 196. 
11 Id. at 151-58. As a form of non-lethal torture, Dershowitz considers shoving steril-
ized needles under the suspect's fingernails. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 148. 
12 Id. at 158. 
13 Id. at 140. See also Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Be-
tween the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. 
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fers to a hypothetical situation where a bomb has been activated and 
the only person who may have information to prevent or minimize 
the potential damage from an explosion of the bomb is the suspect, 
who refuses to disclose this information. I4 The question is whether 
this suspect should be tortured in order to force him or her to reveal 
information that could potentially save many lives. I5 While Dershowitz 
is opposed to torture in general, he argues that people may resort to 
it in a ticking bomb situation. I6 Judicially sanctioned torture, there-
fore, represents Dershowitz's solution for minimizing the use of tor-
ture against terrorist suspects. I7 
By expanding upon Dershowitz's analysis of the ticking bomb 
scenario, this Book Review takes a closer look at the justifications for 
judicially sanctioned torture and then argues against this proposal by 
developing the moral and legal theories that would prohibit its accep-
tance. I8 Part I presents arguments in favor of torturing the ticking 
bomb terrorist, and considers how these arguments might support 
Dershowitz's justification of judicially sanctioned torture. I9 Part II 
then draws upon the underlying values of international human rights 
law and Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional law 
to argue against torturing the ticking bomb terrorist on the basis of 
human dignity.2o This part develops the moral and legal prohibitions 
against torturing the ticking bomb terrorist in order to establish the 
argument against judicially sanctioned torture.21 Part III uses these 
arguments to demonstrate the inherent problems with judicially sanc-
tioned torture. 22 Not only would this proposal undermine judicial in-
tegrity, but it would legitimize a practice that runs counter to moral 
and legal precedent,23 Finally, Part IV seeks to reconcile the apparent 
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 102 (2001); Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty 
Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 166-67 (1973). 
14 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 140. 
15Id. 
16 Id. at 151. 
17Id. at 158. 
18 See discussion infra Parts I, II, III. This Book Review addresses the issue of judicially 
sanctioned torture from a normative standpoint. For sake of argument only, this Book 
Review assumes that non-lethal torture is effective in revealing information to prevent a 
terrorist attack. 
19 See discussion infra Part I. 
20 See discussion infra Part II. 
21 See discussion infra Part II. 
22 See discussion infra Part III. 
23 See discussion infra Part III. 
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conflict between human dignity and national security that arises from 
Dershowitz's analysis of the ticking bomb scenario.24 
Ultimately, this Book Review concludes that judicially sanctioned 
torture is not an appropriate solution for minimizing torture against 
terrorist suspects.25 Society should instead focus on preventing a tick-
ing bomb situation in the first place.26 By expanding the narrow 
framework of Dershowitz's inquiry, it is possible to focus our debate 
on alternative means of maintaining national security that do not vio-
late human dignity.27 
I. THE TICKING BOMB SCENARIO: DERSHOWITZ'S PROPOSAL FOR 
JUDICIALLY SANCTIONED TORTURE 
For more than a century, much of the world has condemned the 
general notion of torture.28 Nonetheless, the more specific notion 
that torture can reveal information to prevent a massive terrorist at-
tack calls for greater attention to the moral and legal arguments in 
favor of this practice.29 Francis Bacon, a seventeenth century English 
legal scholar, would most likely have justified torturing the ticking 
bomb terrorist on the basis that torture is a means to obtaining truth-
ful information.30 According to Bacon, truth is the essence ofjustice.31 
Thus, under this theory, torture can be justified even if it sacrifices 
human dignity, so long as it produces truthful information to preven t 
an imminent terrorist attack.32 
24 See discussion infra Part IV. 
25 See Philip B. Heymann, Torture Should Not be Authorized, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 
2002, at A15. 
26 Schulz, supra note 3, at 25. 
27 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 195-99. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead & Steven H. 
Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the 
USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 10S1, 
1OS3-S4 (2002); Christopher Woo & Miranda So, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 
Highlights the Needfor Increased Surveillance, 15 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 521, 529-·33 (2002). 
28 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 145. 
29 See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUC-
TORY MATERIALS 317 (1999); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135; ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, 
SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TuRBULENT AGE 472 (2002). 
30 See COQUILLETTE, supra note 29, at 317; DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 
279 (1992). 
31 COQUILLETTE, supra note 29, at 317; COQUILLETTE, supra note 30, at 279. 
32 See COQUILLETTE, supra note 29, at 317; COQUILLE'ITE, supra note 30, at 279. 
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Torturing the ticking bomb terrorist can also be justified accord-
ing to philosopher Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility.33 The utili-
tarian principle seeks to maximize the community's total good, pleas-
ure, or happiness.34 On the one hand, if the terrorist suspect is not 
tortured, the suspect is spared from suffering pain, but thousands of 
innocent people die.35 On the other hand, if the terrorist suspect is 
tortured, he suffers pain, but thousands of innocent lives are saved.36 
Thus, under Bentham's theory, it would be permissible to allow one 
terrorist suspect to suffer the pain from non-lethal torture in order to 
save thousands of innocent lives from a massive terrorist attack.37 
Proponents of torturing the ticking bomb terrorist justifY the 
practice from a legal standpoint as welP8 Dershowitz argues that the 
United States Constitution does not prohibit torturing the ticking 
bomb terrorist. 39 That is, if the terrorist suspect is granted immunity 
from incrimination, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-
incrimination would not be implicated because the information re-
vealed by the suspect would not be used against the suspect at tria1.40 
Dershowitz further contends that the due process standard of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would not prohibit torturing the 
ticking bomb terrorist because such a terrorist is not owed the same 
kind of due process that is owed to an ordinary criminal defendant.41 
Moreover, Dershowitz notes that the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against "cruel and unusual punishment" does not apply in this situa-
33 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 142; THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. 
Hart eds., 1996) [hereinafter BENTHAM]. 
34 BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 12. 
35 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 144; BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 12. 
36 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 144; BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 12. 
37 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 144. See BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 12. 
38 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135; DERSHOWITZ, supra note 29, at 472. 
39 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135. 
40 [d. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (holding that the gov-
ernment may compel testimony from an unwilling witness by conferring on the witness 
immunity from use of compelled testimony and use of evidence derived from testimony 
against the witness). 
41 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135; 60 Minutes (CBS News television broadcast, Jan. 
20, 2002). Dershowitz argues that because due process is the process due under the cir-
cumstances, and because the ticking bomb situation represents an extraordinary circum-
stance, the ticking bomb terrorist is not due the same kind of process as compared to a 
suspect under ordinary circumstances. 60 Minutes, supra. Specifically, Dershowitz contends 
that the only process "due" a ticking bomb terrorist is the requirement of probable cause 
and judicial supervision. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135. 
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tion because the ticking bomb terrorist has not yet been convicted.42 
Thus, under Dershowitz's theory, while the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendment protections would bar other uses of torture, they 
do not bar the use of torture in the particular "ticking bomb" circum-
stance.43 
In addition, proponents rely on the legal defense of necessity in 
order to justifY torturing the ticking bomb terrorist.44 According to 
the defense of necessity, society authorizes a person to disregard the 
law if that person is in a strained position and must choose between 
violating the law and preventing a greater harm.45 Like utilitarianism, 
the defense of necessity relies on the concept of preventing a great 
wrong by performing a lesser wrong.46 For example, the Landau 
Commission, established in Israel in 1987, relies on the legal defense 
of necessity to justifY the torturous interrogation methods used by the 
General Security Service (GSS) against terrorist suspectsY 
In light of these moral and legal arguments in favor of torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist, Dershowitz's proposal for judicially sanc-
tioned torture may seem reasonable.48 After all, the point of judicially 
sanctioned torture is not even to encourage the torture of terrorist 
suspects, but rather, to minimize its use.49 Dershowitz contends that 
because torture in the ticking bomb situation is inevitable, society 
must choose between two evils: 1) allow torture to occur "ad hoc, off-
the-books, and under-the-radar-screen," or 2) incorporate it into the 
legal system through judicial warrants. 50 Dershowitz asserts that judi-
42 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135. See, e.g .• Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 
(1977) (confirming that the Eighth Amendment is designed to protect those convicted of 
crimes). 
43 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135. 
44 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 29, at 472. 
45Id. 
46 Gross, supra note 13, at 107. See also BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 12. 
47 See Gross, supra note 13, at 106. The Israel law of necessity, as recognized by the 
Landau Commission, provides: "A person may be exempted from criminal responsibility 
for any act or omission if he can show that it was done or made in order to avoid conse-
quences which could not otherwise be avoided and which would have inflicted grievous 
harm or injury on his person, honour or property or on the person or honour of others 
whom he was bound to protect or on property placed in his charge: Provided that he did 
no more than was reasonably necessary for that purpose and that the harm caused by him 
was not disproportionate to the harm avoided." DERSHOWITZ, supra note 29, at 473 (quot-
ing Israeli law). 
48 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158-59. 
49Id. 
50 Id. at 151, 158. See also Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes, It Should Be 'On the Books,' BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 16,2002, at A15 [hereinafter Dershowitz, On the Books]; Alan M. Dershowitz, Is 
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cially sanctioned torture is the lesser of the two evils.51 Specifically, it 
would reduce the amount of torture by creating a democratic system 
of accountability and by leaving a public record of each warrant 
sought and granted.52 
Indeed, Professor John Langbein of Yale Law School implicitly 
suggests that torture warrants used in sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
tury England accounted for fewer incidents of torture, as compared 
to the number of incidents in France, where torture was left to the 
discretion of local officials.53 In particular, requiring a torture warrant 
would minimize the amount of physical violence against terrorist sus-
pects because judges would not grant the warrant absent a compelling 
reason to do SO.54 According to Dershowitz, a torture warrant would 
also minimize the incidents of torture by creating one more opportu-
nity for the suspect to testify before subjecting him or her to such 
treatmen t. 55 
II. MORAL AND LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST TORTURING 
THE TICKING BOMB TERRORIST 
While Dershowitz's proposal for judicially sanctioned torture may 
seem sensible in light of the apparent justifications for torturing the 
ticking bomb terrorist, it is significantly undermined by the moral and 
legal arguments against torture.56 From the standpoint of human dig-
nity, international law, and United States constitutional law, the rea-
sons for refraining from torture outweigh itsjustifications.57 
A. Human Dignity 
First, the inviolable nature of human dignity belies any 
justifications for torturing the ticking bomb terrorist. 58 In the seven-
teenth century, Sir Edward Coke debated against Francis Bacon to 
There a Torturous Road to Justice?, LA. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at B19 [hereinafter Dershowitz, 
Torturous Road] . 
51 Dershowitz, On the Books, supra note 50, at A15. 
52Id. 
53 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TOR'IURE AND 
TIlE LAW OF PROOF 136-37, 139 (1977). 
54 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158-59. 
55 Id. at 159. 
56 See id. at 135, 149; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
57 See id. at 135, 149; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
58 See Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 
AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 848 (1983); Schulz, supra note 3, at 25; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense 
(MSNBC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002). 
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assert that torture for interrogational purposes violated human dig-
nity and, therefore, could not be justified as a means to obtaining 
truthful information.59 Coke believed that even if an individual were 
guilty, the individual's human dignity could outweigh any state inter-
est in ascertaining the truth.60 
Relying on a similar notion of human dignity, philosopher Im-
manuel Kant opposed torture on the basis that it improperly used 
people as a means to achieve an end.61 As part of his categorical im-
perative, Kant asserted that humans should always be treated as an 
end and never as a means.62 Kant would therefore object to torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist because this would violate the terrorist's 
autonomy, the basis of human dignity, for the end purpose of prevent-
ing a massive terrorist attack.63 In this light, the utilitarian justification 
for torturing the ticking bomb terrorist is unconvincing in that it con-
siders the human life of the terrorist as merely a means for saving 
other lives.64 
B. International Law 
Not only does the notion of human dignity underlie the moral 
arguments against torture, but it also serves as the basis of interna-
tionallegal prohibitions against torture.65 The United States is bound 
by two covenants that expressly prohibit torture: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
59 COQUILLETrE, supra note 29, at 317. See generally SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART 
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1641). 
60 COQUILLETrE, supra note 29, at 317. 
6! DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 149. According to Immanuel Kant, "man and gener-
ally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used 
by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational 
beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end." IMMANUEL KANT, KANT"S 
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 46 (Tho-
mas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 6th ed. 1909). 
62 KANT, supra note 61, at 47. 
63 See id. at 54. 
64 See id. 
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, S. EXEC. 
Doc. No. 95-2, at 23 (1978),999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10. 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 V.N.T.S. 85, 113 
[hereinafter UN Convention Against Torture]. 
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or Punishment (UN Convention Against Torture).66 Article 7 of the 
ICCPR states that "[nlo one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. "67 Article 10 of the 
ICCPR states that "[alII persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person."68 Likewise, the UN Convention Against Torture pro-
hibits torture on the basis that humans are endowed with "inalienable 
rights" that "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person 
.... "69 Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture states that 
"[nlo exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or 
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. "70 These two inter-
national treaties therefore prohibit torture because it would infringe 
upon the inviolable right to human dignity.71 
Even in the context of the ticking bomb scenario, these interna-
tional treaties would most likely prohibit torturing the terrorist sus-
pect. 72 Indeed, in 1999 the High Court of Justice in Israel ruled 
against using torture to interrogate terrorist suspects because it vio-
lates international conventions and "infringes on both the suspect's 
dignity and his individual privacy. "73 Later that same year, the Su-
preme Court of Israel determined that neither the government nor 
the GSS possess the authority to use "liberty infringing physical 
means" during the interrogation of terrorist suspects "unless these 
means are inherently accessory to the very essence of an interrogation 
66 ICCPR, supra note 65, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-2, at 23, 999 V.N.T.S. at 175. See gener-
ally VN Convention Against Torture, supra note 65, S. TREA"IY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465 
V.N.T.S. at 113. 
67 ICCPR, supra note 65, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-2, at 25, 999 V.N.T.S. at 175. 
68 ICCPR, supra note 65, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-2, at 26, 999 V.N.T.S. at art. 10, at 176. 
69 VN Convention Against Torture, supra note 65, S. TREA"IY Doc. No. 10020, at 19, 
1465 V.N.T.S. at 113. 
70 VN Convention Against Torture, supra note 65, S. TREA"IY Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 
1465 V.N.T.S. at art. 2, at 114. 
71 See ICCPR, supra note 65, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-2, at 26, 999 V.N.T.S. at art. 10, at 
176; VN Convention Against Torture, supra note 65, S. TREA"IY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 
1465 V.N.T.S. at 113. 
72 See Melissa L. Clark, Israel's High Court of Justice Ruling on the General Security Service Use 
of "Moderate Physical Pressure": An End to the Sanctioned Use of Torturer 11 IND. INT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 145, 164 (2000). 
78 Supreme Court of Israel: Judgmen t Concerning the Legality of the General Security 
Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1478 (Sept. 9,1999); also available atH.C. 
5100/94, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel V. Israel (Sept. 9,1999), available 
at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.htm!. 
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and are both fair and reasonable. "74 With this in mind, the use of tor-
ture against the ticking bomb terrorist in the United States would 
most likely be prohibited by the ICCPR and the UN Convention 
Against Torture.75 
C. United States Constitutional Law 
United States constitutional law would further prohibit torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist. 76 The basis of this prohibition has been 
most prominently established through case law addressing the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.77 
1. Due Process 
Contrary to Dershowitz's assertions, the due process standard of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments implicitly prohibits torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist on the basis of human dignity.78 Due proc-
ess not only entails the procedural right to fair notice, but also entails 
the substantive right to life, liberty, and property.79 Thus, even if the 
ticking bomb terrorist were tortured in accordance with the due pro-
cess requirement of procedural fairness, the substantive due process 
requirement implicitly prohibits the torture.80 Under the substantive 
due process standard articulated by the Unites States Supreme Court, 
the terrorist suspect is protected from state conduct that "shocks the 
conscience" and offends our sense ofjustice.81 
74 [d. at 1488. 
75 ICCPR. supra note 65, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-2, at 25, 999 V.N.T.S. at 175. See gener-
ally VN Convention Against Torture, supra note 65, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 
1465 V.N.T.S. at 113. 
76 See Winston v. Lee, 470 V.S. 753, 766 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 V.S. 757, 
767 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 V.S. 165, 172 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 V.S. 
278,286 (1936). 
77 See Winston, 470 V.S. at 766; Schmerber, 384 V.S. at 767; Rochin,342 V.S. at 172; 
Brown, 297 V.S. at 286. 
78 See Rochin, 342 V.S. at 172; Brown, 297 V.S. at 286. 
79 See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that, "quite apart 
from any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement 
officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law. H); Tom Farmer, Debate 
Arises Over Torture, BOSTON HERALD,Jan. 22, 2002, at 7. 
80 SeeJohnson, 481 F.2d at 1032. 
81 See Rochin, 342 V.S. at 172; Brown, 297 V.S. at 286-87. 
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In particular, the Court has found police conduct to "shock the 
conscience" where the conduct resulted in physical force and the 
infliction of pain upon the suspect.82 For example, in Brown v. Missis-
sippi, the police hanged one suspect by a rope to the limb of tree and 
severely whipped him and the other suspects until they confessed.83 
The Court held that the police conduct in forcing the confessions of 
suspects was offensive to the "sense of justice."84 In emphasizing the 
means by which the police obtained the information from the sus-
pects, the Court stated that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of 
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to pro-
cure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confes-
sions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a 
clear denial of due process."85 Thus, the Court determined that the 
whipping and hanging of the suspects violated their rights to due pro-
cess.86 
In a later case, the Supreme Court in Rnchin v. California found 
less violent conduct to "shock the conscience" in violation of due pro-
cess.87 In Rnchin, the police, believing that morphine capsules swal-
lowed by the suspect contained narcotics, unsuccessfully attempted to 
remove these capsules from the suspect's mouth.88 The police then 
took Rochin to a hospital and ordered doctors to pump his stomach 
in order to retrieve the capsules.89 As in Brown, the Court emphasized 
the outrageous means by which the police extracted evidence from 
the suspect.90 The Court stated, "we are compelled to conclude that 
the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about 
combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science."91 The Court further stated, "It has long since ceased to be 
82 See Rochill, 342 U.S. at 172; Brown, 297 U.S. at 286-87 see also United States v. Fer-
nandez-Cam, 677 F. Supp.893, 895 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (use of physical torture by foreign 
officers to coerce information fmm defendant was sufficiently "shocking to the con-
science" so as to require suppression of evidence). 
83 Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-82. 
84 Id. at 286-87. 
85Id. (emphasis added). 
86 Id. at 286. 
87 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
88Id. at 166. 
89Id. 
90 Compare Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, with Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
91 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added). 
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true that due process of law is heedless of the means by which other-
wise relevant and credible evidence is obtained.''92 
Indeed, Rochin can be distinguished from other cases where the 
Supreme Court did not find police conduct "shocking to the con-
science. "93 For instance, Rochin is unlike Breithaupt v. Abram, where the 
Court determined that taking a blood sample from the suspect to de-
termine his blood alcohol level was a procedure that occurs in "every-
day life" and was therefore not "shocking to the conscience. "94 Unlike 
the blood test in Abram, the stomach pumping in Rochin was certainly 
not a routine procedure and therefore amounted to conduct that was 
sufficiently "shocking to the conscience" to violate the due process 
standard.95 
Applying the standards set forth in Brown and Rochin to the tor-
ture of the ticking bomb terrorist, it is clear that torturous conduct 
against the terrorist suspect would not survive due process scrutiny.96 
The torturous means by which information is procured would "shock 
the conscience" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.97 Because torture inflicts excruciating pain on the suspect to 
the point of submission, such means of obtaining information would 
offend the "sense of justice" that the due process standard upholds.98 
Specifically, if the hanging and whipping of the 'suspect in Brown 
was too offensive to the "sense of justice" to survive the due process 
standard, then the torture of the ticking bomb terrorist would like-
wise fail to survive this standard.99 Even if law enforcement officials 
were to rely on less extreme forms of torture against the ticking bomb 
terrorist, the use of torture would nonetheless violate the "shock the 
conscience" standard established in Rochin.100 After all, if the use of 
force to pump the suspect's stomach in Rochin was considered "shock-
ing to the conscience," then it is even more "shocking to the con-
science" to intentionally inflict pain on the terrorist suspect until he 
or she can no longer tolerate the pain and agrees to reveal pertinent 
92Id. (emphasis added). 
93 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957). 
94 See id. at 436-37; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
95 See Abram, 352 U.S. at 436-37; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
96 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). 
97 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
98 See Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86. 
99 See id. 
100 See Rochin, 342 U.S at 172. 
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information.101 Furthermore, unlike the routine nature of the blood 
test in Abram, where there was no due process violation, the use of tor-
ture against the ticking bomb terrorist is surely not a routine prac-
tice. 102 Torturing the ticking bomb terrorist would therefore be pro-
hibited by the due process standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 103 
2. Search and Seizure 
Not only would torturing the ticking bomb terrorist violate due 
process, but it would also violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.104 As the Supreme Court 
stated in Schmerber v. California, "[t]he overriding function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State."105 Although the Court in Schmer-
ber held that the involuntary extraction of a blood sample from a mo-
torist to determine whether he was intoxicated did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court warned that its holding "in no way in-
dicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under 
other conditions. "106 
Later, in Winston v. Lee, where the suspect was compelled to un-
dergo chest surgery to recover a bullet fired by the victim, the Su-
preme Court balanced a number of factors and ultimately determined 
that the surgical intrusion was unreasonable and hence in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.107 Among the factors considered were: 1) the 
threshold requirement of probable cause; 2) the extent to which the 
procedure may threaten the suspect's safety or health; 3) the extent of 
intrusion upon the suspect's dignitary interests in personal privacy 
101 See id. See also United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893, 894-95 (S.D. Tex. 
1987) (stating that "[e]ven more than in Rochin, the methods employed here [beating 
defendant's face and body, pouring water through his nostrils while he was stripped, 
bound, and gagged, and applying electrical shocks to his wet body] were 'too close to the 
rack and the screw' to be acceptable."). 
102 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957). 
103 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172; Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
104 SeeWinston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
105 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
106Id. at 772. 
107 Winston, 470 U.S. at 766. 
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and bodily integrity; 4) the community's interest in fairly and accu-
rately determining guilt or innocence; and 5) the feasibility of alter-
native means of producing the pertinent evidence. los 
Applying this "reasonableness" test to the ticking bomb scenario, 
torturing the ticking bomb terrorist would qualifY as an unreasonable 
seizure of the suspect in violation of the Fourth Amendment.109 Un-
like the blood test in Schmerber, where the degree of intrusion on the 
suspect was minimal, the use of torture against the ticking bomb ter-
rorist is much more intrusive.110 In addition, if the surgical procedure 
in Winston, conducted in a sterilized hospital by a professional doctor, 
was considered to be a risk to the suspect's health, then the torture of 
the terrorist suspect by law enforcement officials would be equally if 
not more risky to the suspect's health.111 Moreover, the Court in 
Winston considered the surgical procedure to be an extensive intru-
sion on the suspect's personal privacy and bodily integrity because it 
required the suspect to relinquish control of his body.112 Similarly, tor-
turing a terrorist suspect requires the suspect to relinquish bodily 
control and to suffer excruciating pain, thereby resulting in an exten-
sive intrusion on personal privacy and bodily integrity.1l3 Thus, in 
light of Schmerber and Winston, the use of torture against the terrorist 
suspect would violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.114 
108 [d. at 760-63. 
\09 See id. at 766. 
1\0 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
1i1 See Winston, 470 U.S. at 763-64. 
1\2 [d. at 765. 
1\3 See id. 
1\4 See id. at 766; Schmerber 384 U.S. at 767. Considering two other factors of the "rea-
sonableness test," namely, the community'S interest in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the suspect, and the feasibility of alternative means of producing the pertinent evi-
dence, it is clear that the former factor is not relevant here, where the purpose of torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist is not to determine guilt or innocence, but to extract informa-
tion about an imminent terrorist attack. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 135; Winston, 470 
U.S. at 763. The latter factor, however, is relevant to determining the reasonableness of 
torturing the ticking bomb terrorist. Arguably, if there are no means of producing evi-
dence of an imminent terrorist attack other than by torturing the terrorist suspect, then it 
would seem reasonable to torture the suspect in order to save hundreds of innocent lives. 
See Winston, 470 U.S. at 763. Nonetheless, Part IV of this Book Review suggests that there 
are alternative means to producing evidence of an imminent terrorist attack such that it is 
possible to prevent the ticking bomb situation from arising in the first place. See discussion 
infra Part IV. 
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III. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Given the significant moral and legal arguments against torturing 
the ticking bomb terrorist, judicially sanctioned torture is wrong from 
a normative standpoint. ll5 From the outset, judicially sanctioned tor-
ture undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.U6 The 
problem with judicially sanctioned torture is not only that the torture 
itself violates the human dignity of the individual suspects, but that 
the act of judicially sanctioning the torture taints the "purity of [the] 
courts. "U7 Because torture violates human dignity, having judges issue 
torture warrants entangles the judiciary in an abuse of human dig-
nity.u8 
The concept of judicial integrity may be viewed as the role of the 
judiciary in leading by example and in invalidating or rectifying cer-
tain kinds of offensive official action.u9 The underlying goals of judi-
cial integrity are that the court is to be regarded as a symbol of law-
fulness and justice and that the court does not ally itself with bad 
acts. 120 As Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States, 
[d]ecency, security, and liberty alike demand that govern-
ment officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct 
that are commands to the citizen .... Our government is the 
poten t, the omnipresen t teacher. . . . If the govern men t be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law .... 121 
115 See Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its &-Emergence in the Adjudication of 
Criminal Cases. 84j. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462,466 (1993); Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, 
supra note 58. While this Book Review analyzes judicially sanctioned torture from a norma-
tive standpoint, there are noteworthy empirical arguments against this practice. See Schulz, 
supra note 3, at 25; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. For instance, judicially sanc-
tioned torture improperly assumes that law enforcement officials will be able to take their 
suspects into custody, ascertain that the suspects are terrorists who possess the necessary 
information to prevent a massive terrorist attack, apply to an appropriate judge for a tor-
ture warrant, argue their case for such a warrant, inflict torture sufficient to illicit the nec-
essary information, and evaluate the validity of that information. See Schulz, supra note 3, 
at 25; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. Moreover, it would be difficult to accom-
plish all these steps under a strict time constraint so as to pre-empt an imminent terrorist 
attack. See Schulz, supra note 3, at 25; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. 
116 See Bloom, supra note 115, at 466. 
117 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, j., dissenting). See 
Bloom, supra note 115, at 466. 
118 Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. 
119 Bloom, supra note 115, at 464. 
120Id. 
121 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,j., dissenting). 
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In other words, on the basis of judicial integrity, judges are the pri-
mary insurers of lawful acts by the government.122 As such, judges 
should not sanction or participate in illegal or unfair acts.123 If a judge 
issues a warrant to torture a ticking bomb terrorist, the judge is par-
ticipating in an act that violates the principle of human dignity that 
underlies international law and United States constitutional law.124 
Thus, in an effort to maintain the sanctity of the courts, judges should 
not be in a position to authorize illegal acts of torture.125 
Even Francis Bacon, who would have supported torturing the 
ticking bomb terrorist, would likely have opposed judicially sanctioned 
torture in order to uphold judicial in tegrity.126 Bacon stated: 
[A]bove all things, integrity is ... [a judge's] portion and 
proper virtue .... The principal duty of the judge is, to sup-
press force and fraud .... In causes of life and death judges 
ought ... to remember mercy, and to cast ... a merciful eye 
upon the person.127 
Thus, even if torturing the ticking bomb terrorist were justifiable, the 
need to maintain judicial integrity would weigh heavily against justify-
ing judicially sanctioned torture.128 
Moreover, by issuing warrants to torture terrorist suspects, judges 
risk legitimizing a practice that counters United States and in tern a-
tionallegal precedent.129 Judicially sanctioned torture would send the 
erroneous message to society that torture is lawful and that there is 
nothing improper with this practice.130 To the extent that the United 
States is the exemplar of democracy and human rights, it would be 
wrong for this nation to abandon the rule of law. 131 Dershowitz him-
self recognizes the high stakes involved if the United States were to 
declare its intention to allow non-lethal torture of the ticking bomb 
terrorist.132 Such a declaration would become a precedent for other 
122 See id.; Bloom, supra note 115, at 464. 
123 Bloom, supra note 115, at 464. 
124 See 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
125 See id; Bloom, supra note 115, at 464. 
126 See COQUILLETrE, supra note 29, at 336. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See 601Hinutes, supra note 41. 
130 See Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, 5Upra note 58; Today 
(NBC News television broadcast, Sept. 25, 2002). 
131 See Today (NBC News television broadcast, Jan. 29, 2002); 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
132 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 142. 
2003] Book Review 209 
nations because this country's actions help define international law. 133 
If the United States approved of torture in one set of circumstances, 
this would encourage its widespread and routine use in other coun-
tries.134 This would also make it more difficult for the United States to 
condemn this practice if it were used against American citizens 
abroad.135 Consequently, judicially sanctioned torture would increase 
rather than decrease the prevalence of torture. 136 
IV. RECONCILING NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
This Book Review argues that judicially sanctioned torture is not 
an appropriate solution for minimizing the use of torture against tick-
ing bomb terrorists.137 Yet, by not judicially sanctioning torture, will 
the use of torture against ticking bomb terrorists continue unfet-
tered?138 Expanding the narrow framework of Dershowitz's moral in-
quiry reveals that the answer to this question is no.139 
Under Dershowitz's narrow framework, society must choose be-
tween national security on the one hand, and either "off-the-books" 
torture or judicially sanctioned torture on the other hand.140 In other 
words, Dershowitz forces us to choose between national security and 
human dignity.141 He states, "If we do not torture, we compromise the 
security and safety of our citizens. "142 Seen in this narrow framework, 
it is not surprising that Dershowitz chooses to judicially sanction tor-
ture as the lesser of two evils in the name of national security.143 
By expanding the framework of Dershowitz's inquiry, however, 
the cost of upholding human dignity need not be the sacrifice of na-
tional security.144 It is possible to refrain from judicially sanctioned 
torture by developing alternative, less invasive means of upholding 
133 See id. 
134Id. at 145; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15. 
135 See Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. 
136 See id. 
137 See discussion supra Part III. 
138 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158. 
139 See id. at 195-99. See, e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-84; Woo & So, 
supra note 27, at 529-33. 
140 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158. 
141 Id. at 153. 
142Id. 
143 See id. at 158; Dershowitz, On the Books, supra note 50, at A15. 
144 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 195-99. See, e.g., \Vhitehead & Aden, supra note 
27, at 1083-84; Woo & So, supra note 27, at 529-33. 
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national security.145 Dershowitz himself offers alternative ways to in-
crease security: issuing national identification cards, restricting immi-
gration, increasing the number of security checkpoints, increasing the 
presence of electronic surveillance, and improving our intelligence 
system}46 By developing these alternative measures of increasing na-
tional security, law enforcement officials and citizens may be able to 
gather evidence of imminent terrorist plots before having to resort to 
torturing the ticking bomb terrorist for such information.147 
One benefit of using alternative measures for increasing national 
security is that law enforcement officials will be less likely to rely on 
coerced information from terrorist suspects as the sole source of evi-
dence of imminent terrorist attacks}48 As John Henry Wigmore fore-
warns, coerced confessions are problematic to the extent that they 
discourage a complete investigation of the evidence.149 Wigmore 
states, "any system of administration which permits the prosecution to 
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must 
itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly 
upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investiga-
tion of other sources."150 To this extent, judicially sanctioned torture 
would discourage efforts to seek alternative sources of reliable evi-
dence of imminent terrorist attacks}51 It is through these alternative 
sources that society should try to prevent a ticking bomb situation 
from arising in the first place}52 In this way, and not by judicially sanc-
tioning torture, we can minimize the need to torture terrorist sus-
pects.153 
To be sure, many of these alternative measures are themselves 
quite invasive, if not of human dignity, then of other individual rights 
such as liberty and privacy}54 Thus, it is important to expand the 
145 See, e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-84; Woo & So, supra note 27, at 
529-33. 
146 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 195-199. 
147 See id. 
148 SeeJOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON TIlE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251 (2d ed. 1923). 
149 See id. 
150Id. 
151 See id. 
152 See Schulz, supra note 3, at 25; See e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-
84; Woo & So, supra note 27, at 529-33. 
153 See Schulz, supra note 3, at 25; See e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-
84; Woo & So, supra note 27, at 529-33. 
154 See James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, 29 HUM. RTS. 8, 8 (2002); 
Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-84; Woo & So, supra note 27. at 529-33. 
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framework of Dershowitz's analysis so that our nation can begin to 
determine the extent to which citizens may, if at all, forgo certain civil 
liberties in the name of national security.155 Ideally, there should be 
no costs, in terms of civil liberties, to uphold national security.156 Yet, 
if our nation must pay a price, it is better to invest our current ener-
gies in identifYing and strengthening proposals that minimize the risk 
of infringing liberty, than in devising a complex judicially sanctioned 
torture system that undermines human dignity.157 If the hard choice is 
between two evils in the name of national security, it would be better 
to risk minimal amounts of our liberty rather than to sacrifice all of 
our human dignity.158 
CONCLUSION 
In his book, lWzy Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Respond-
ing to the Challenge, Alan Dershowitz argues in favor of judicially sanc-
tioned torture of the ticking bomb terrorist.159 He argues that this 
proposal will minimize and prevent the use of torture against ticking 
bomb terrorists by creating a democratic system of accountability.160 
Although Dershowitz offers compelling arguments in favor of judi-
cially sanctioned torture, his proposal is both morally and legally rep-
rehensible. 161 
From a moral standpoint, the need to uphold the universal fun-
damental right of human dignity prohibits torture under any circum-
stance, even in the case of the ticking bomb terrorist.162 This concept 
of human dignity also serves as the basis for international legal prohi-
bitions against torture. 163 Moreover, United States courts would most 
likely find that torturing the ticking bomb terrorist violates the consti-
155 See Dempsey. supra note 154, at 8; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-84; 
Woo & So, supra note 27, at 529-33. 
156 See Dempsey, supra note 154, at 8. 
157 See id. IT, in the name of national security, Dempsey is weary of risking civil liberties, 
then it would be even worse to accept a wholesale loss of human dignity through judicially 
sanctioned torture. See id; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15. 
158 See Dempsey, supra note 154, at 8; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15. 
159 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158. 
160 See id. 
161 See Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; Schulz, supra note 3, at 25. 
162 See Schulz, supra note 3, at 25; Today, supra note 130. 
163 ICCPR, supra note 65, at 175. See generally UN Convention Against Torture, supra 
note 65, at 113. 
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tutional due process standard and the prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures. 1M 
Considering that torturing the ticking bomb terrorist would not 
survive moral and legal scrutiny, it is not possible to justify judicially 
sanctioned torture of the ticking bomb terrorist.165 Not only would 
this proposal undermine judicial integrity, but it would send the erro-
neous message that torture is legitimate.166 For these reasons, judi-
cially sanctioned torture is not the proper solution for minimizing the 
use of torture against ticking bomb terrorists. 167 
The threat of terrorism facing our nation today is a large scale 
problem that would be more appropriately addressed by focusing on 
methods of increasing national security without infringing on human 
dignity.168 While it is tempting to anticipate the ticking bomb scenario 
and to analyze ways to properly torture the ticking bomb terrorist, our 
efforts would be more effectively served by upholding the fundamen-
tal values and principles underlying our democracy.169 After all, the 
war against terrorism is not simply a military battle, but it is also a bat-
tle to defend our national values, including human dignity, justice, 
and the rule of law.170 To resort to judicially sanctioned torture as a 
means of preserving national security would be to abandon the most 
basic principles of democracy and capitulate to the goals of terror-
ism. l7l Surely, this must not be allowed.172 
164 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985); Sehmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966); Roehin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278,286 (1936). 
165 See Bloom, supra note 115, at 466; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. 
166 See Bloom, supra note 115, at 466; Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; 60 Minutes, su-
pra note 41. 
84. 
167 See Heymann, supra note 25, at A15; Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58. 
168 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 158; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 27, at 1083-
169 See Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, supra note 58; Today, supra note 131. 
170 See Today, supra note 131. 
171 See id.; 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
172 See 60 Minutes, supra note 41. 
